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JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(k)(1994).
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

There are four issues presented on appeal.

The standard of

appeal of each is the same and is presented below.
1.

Whether the warranty deed by which plaintiff/appellant

Maxwell (^Maxwell") conveyed certain property (the "property") to
Trendland, Inc. (^Trendland") obligated her to bring any actions
to recover the property in her own name.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum

in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
("Opposition Memorandum"), filed in case below (Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No.

920901881); Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment
("Transcript") in case below, held before the Hon. Tyrone E.
Medley on March 25, 1995, page 7.
2.

Whether Maxwell suffered damages because of her

obligation to Trendland on account of the warranty deed.
Opposition Memorandum: Transcript, pages 7-10.
3.

Whether Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

requires that plaintiffs/appellants be allowed to substitute
Trendland, as the real party in interest with such substitution
1

relating back to the time the lawsuit was originally filed.

Opposition Memorandum.
4.

Whether defendants/appellees John S. Adams and Taylor,

Ennenga, Adams & Lowe (Mefendants")are estopped from claiming
that

Maxwell has no damages because, at a point in time after

Maxwell had conveyed the property to Trendland they represented
her in an action in which they defended her from a claim that she
never rightfully owned the property.

Transcript, pages 9-10.

Standard of Review: The appellate court shall correct
any error made by the trial court in granting a motion for

summary judgment.

Aragon Y, Clover Club Foods Company, 837

p.2d 250 (Utah ct. App. 1993); Rawlins v, Petersen, 813 p.2d
1156, 1159 (Utah 1991) .
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 17(a) (1995) :

(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without
joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought;
and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state
of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest
until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or

2

substitution of, the real party in interest; and such
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same
effect as if the action hac been commenced in the name of
the real party in interest.
2.

Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12 (1994):

Form of Warranty Deed - Effect.
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following
form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert
place of residence), hereby conveys and warrants to
(insert name), grantee, of
(insert
name of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the
following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day of
, 19
.
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his
heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together
with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto
belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and
personal representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the
premises; that he has good right to convey the same; that he
guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet
possession thereof; that the premises are free from all
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and personal
representatives will forever warrant and defend the title
thereof in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all
lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenants
may be briefly inserted in such deed following the
description of the land.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case was brought by the plaintiffs/appellants for legal
malpractice.
Defendants John T. Caine, Randall W. Richards; Richards,
Caine & Allen have settled with plaintiffs/appellants and are no
longer parties to the lawsuit.
The remaining defendants brought a motion for summary
judgment based on their contention that Maxwell suffered no
damages.

The lower court granted this motion and signed an order

to that effect on April 20# 1995.
This appeal seeks reversal of the lower court's granting of
defendants' motion for summary judgment.

FACTS
1.

Appellant Sandra L. Maxwell (^Maxwell") has asserted

claims against defendants/appellees (^defendants") based on legal
malpractice.

She seeks monetary damages which she has suffered

as a result of the loss of certain real property designated as
the Pepperwood Property (the ^property").

Her claims are set

forth in the Amended Complaint under the Eleventh and Twelfth
Claims for Relief. (Amended Complaint, paragraphs 117, 261-271
and Prayer for Relief for the Eleventh and Twelfth Claims,
Attachment 1.)
4

2.

On February 27, 1976, Advance Business Equipment

assigned to Maxwell a Uniform Real Estate Contract it had entered
into on April 28, 1970 between H.R. Fisher and Frances Fisher
relating to the purchase of the property.

(Deposition of Maxwell

taken on October 21,1994, pp. 29 and 30 ("Maxwell Deposition");
Assignment of Contract, Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 to the Maxwell
Deposition; Deposition of Richard C. Burke ("Burke") taken on
October 24 and 25, 1994, p. 60 ("Burke Deposition"), Attachment
2.)
3.

On May 20, 1983, Frances Fisher conveyed by warranty

deed to Maxwell the property (Maxwell Deposition, p. 37 and
Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 thereto, Attachment 3.)
4.

In 1984, Patricia Wade ("Wade") brought an action

("first lawsuit") asserting her right to the property, naming
Burke, Advance Business Equipment and Maxwell as defendants. At
the time of the first lawsuit title to the property was held in
Maxwell's name.

(Amended Complaint, paragraph 117; Burke

Deposition, pages 74-75, Attachment 4.)
5.

In September 1987 Maxwell conveyed the property to

Trendland, Inc. (*Trendland") by warranty deed in exchange for
90% of Trendland's outstanding stock shares.

This transfer was

accomplished while the first lawsuit was still pending.
5

It was

made with Trendland's full knowledge, with the understanding that
Maxwell would continue to defend her ownership to the property.
(Maxwell Deposition, pp. 46 and 47; Burke Deposition, pp. Ill,
112 and 117; Maxwell Deposition Defendants' Exhibit No. 3,
Warranty Deed, Attachment 5.)
6.

In August 1988, defendants began representing Maxwell

in the first lawsuit.

(Burke Deposition, pp. 294-98, Attachment

6.)
7.

In June 1988, Maxwell's deposition was taken in the

first lawsuit.

During her testimony she indicated that Trendland

owned the property. (Maxwell Deposition, pp. 135-36 and 150-51,
Attachment 7.)

SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
Maxwell has incurred damages as the result of defendants'
malpractice.
warranty deed.

She conveyed the property to Trendland in 1987 by
When the Court found against Maxwell in the first

lawsuit and awarded the property to Appellant Burke's ex-wife,
Patricia Wade, Maxwell breached the provisions of the warranty
deed and became liable to Trendland for the value of the
property.
If the Court determines that Trendland is the real party in
interest, Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
6

requires that Maxwell be given time to substitute Trendland for
herself.
Defendants are estopped from claiming Maxwell has suffered
no damages.

They represented her in the first lawsuit as if she

did have an interest in the property.

They committed malpractice

by failing to join Trendland to the first lawsuit as the real
party in interest.

Instead, they represented Maxwell, committed

further malpractice which resulted in the loss of the property,
and now say they cannot be liable for damages because Maxwell has
no loss.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
BY CONVEYING THE PROPERTY TO TRENDLAND BY WARRANTY
DEED, MAXWELL OBLIGATED HERSELF TO BRING ANY ACTIONS TO
RECOVER THE PROPERTY OR MONETARY DAMAGES IN HER OWN
NAME
Defendants contend that any claims relating to the loss of
the property belong to Trendland rather than Maxwell. This
argument ignores the effect of a conveyance of property by
warranty deed and the fact that this is an action for legal
malpractice committed by defendants in a lawsuit to which
Trendland was not a party.
A warranty deed requires that:

7

the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives will
forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee,
his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever,
Utah Code Ann, §57-1-12 (1994).

Patricia Wade brought an action

against Burke, Advance Business Equipment and Maxwell in 1984
seeking to have the property declared marital property of her
marriage with Burke,

While that action was still pending in

September of 1987, Maxwell conveyed the property to Trendland by
warranty deed.

The conveyance was made with the full knowledge

of Trendland, with the understanding that Maxwell would continue
to defend title to the property in the ongoing lawsuit in her
name.

The goal was to successfully defend title in Maxwell's

name in order that the property be rightfully held by Trendland.
Maxwell did not prevail in that prior lawsuit due to
defendants' malpractice, as well as that of the other named
defendants in this action.1

The trial court's order nullified

the transfer of the property to Maxwell in the first place,
causing her to be in breach of the warranty deed to Trendland.
Maxwell brought the present action in order to recover damages
she has suffered in breaching her contract with Trendland.

1

These defendants have settled out of the case.
8

POINT II
AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANTS' MALPRACTICE, MAXWELL
BREACHED HER CONTRACT WITH TRENDLAND AND LIABLE TO
TRENDLAND FOR THE MONETARY VALUE OF THE LOST PROPERTY
Maxwell brought the complaint in this matter to recover
monetary damages for the loss she suffered as a result of
defendants' malpractice.

When she unsuccessfully defended her

right to the property because of appellees' malpractice, she lost
her interest in the property retroactively.

Her transfer of the

property to Trendland by warranty deed required her to guarantee
title in her name. When she could not deliver on that promise
she breached her agreement with Trendland.

As a result she owes

Trendland the value of the property lost. That is the amount she
seeks in the present case.
Defendants have indicated that Maxwell has suffered no loss,
except for the indirect loss she suffers as a shareholder of
Trendland.

Their view is that until Trendland makes a demand of

some kind, Maxwell has suffered no loss.

Defendants cannot cite

any case law to support this unique view.
The principle that a plaintiff may recover for an
anticipated future loss appears to be well established.

Damages

which have not yet occurred, but which are ^reasonably certain"
to arise, may be recovered by a plaintiff.

9

Walton v. City of

Bozeman. 588 P.2d 518, 522 (Mont. 1978).

See also Sagebrush

Development. Inc. v. Moehrke. 604 P.2d 198, 203-204 (Wyo. 1979);
Pierce v. Johns-Manvilie Sales Corp.. 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md.
Ct. App. 1983); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co.. 628 F.Supp. 1219,
1230 (D.Mass. 1986)(plaintiff may recover where there is a
"reasonable probability" that the loss will occur).

The only

limitation on this right is that the damages which are
"reasonably certain" to occur should not be too speculative.
Nashland Associates v. Shumate. 730 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Term. Ct.
App. 1987).
In the case at hand, Maxwell's loss is certain to occur if
it has not happened already.

She has clearly breached the

warranty deed with which she conveyed the property to Trendland.
The amount of the damages is not speculative.
the property in question is not in doubt.

The identity of

Maxwell's damages are

the value of the property lost by Trendland.

The loss is#

therefore, fixed, and can be ascertained accurately by a
professional appraisal of the property's value.

POINT III
IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT TRENDLAND IS THE REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST, MAXWELL SHOULD BE GIVEN A REASONABLE
TIME TO SUBSTITUTE TRENDLAND

10

If the Court determines that Trendland is the real party in
interest, Rule 17(a) requires that Maxwell have a reasonable time
to substitute Trendland in her place.

Rule 17(a) also states

that such substitution relates back to the filing date of the
original complaint for determination of the running of the
applicable statute of limitations.

POINT IV
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING MAXWELL HAS
SUFFERED NO DAMAGES SINCE SHE DID NOT OWN THE PROPERTY
AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED MALPRACTICE BECAUSE THEY
REPRESENTED HER IN A LAWSUIT AS IF SHE DID OWN THE
PROPERTY
Defendants contend that because they did not begin
representing Maxwell until almost a year after she had conveyed
the property to Trendland, Appellees could not have done anything
to create an estoppel issue.

Their contention does not reflect a

correct understanding of the elements necessary to prove an
estoppel.

Estoppel requires proof of three elements:

1) A statement, admission, act or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted.
2) Reasonable action or inaction taken or not taken on the
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure
to act.
3) Injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
statement, admission, act or failure to act.

11

CECO Corporation v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967,
969-70 (Utah 1989). £££ alSQ Orton v. Utah State Tax Commission.
Collection Division. 864 P.2d 904, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Each of these elements is present in the case at hand.
Defendants represented Maxwell, beginning in August 1988, in
an action where the determination of the rightful ownership of a
piece of real property was the principal issue.

In the course of

their representation of Maxwell, defendants never sought to join
Trendland as a party to the litigation.

Defendants state that

they did not know of Trendland's ownership of the property at the
time they represented Maxwell.

Even if they did not have actual

knowledge, they did have constructive knowledge.
Defendants stepped into the case at an advanced stage of the
proceedings.

It was their duty to get up to speed on all the

facts of the case.

Defendants began representing Maxwell about a

month after her deposition was taken in the first lawsuit.
During that deposition she stated that she had conveyed her
interest in the property to Trendland.
150-51, Attachment 7.)

(Maxwell Deposition, pp.

In a case where the central issue was the

proper ownership of a piece of property, defendants should have
checked the history of transfers of that property.

12

At the very

least they should have reviewed the transcript of their client's
deposition.
Defendants should have known about the transfer to
Trendland.

They did not join Trendland to the first lawsuit.

They represented Maxwell as if she had a stake in the property at
issue there.

Now they have taken an inconsistent position by

claiming she has no damages as a result of her unsuccessful
defense of the first lawsuit.

Therefore# the first element of

estoppel is present.
In bringing the present lawsuit in her name# Maxwell relied
on the fact that appellees represented her and not Trendland in
the first suit.

This reliance on her part was reasonable because

she was named in the first lawsuit and she had the attorneyclient relationship with defendants.

Therefore, the second

element of estoppel is satisfied.
The third element is satisfied also.

Maxwell would suffer

the injury of losing her cause of action for legal malpractice if
defendants are allowed to contradict their prior actions by
claiming she has no damages.

If this occurs Maxwell will lose

the equivalent of the value of the property, which is several
hundred thousand dollars.

13

Defendants' position is that Maxwell should have made sure
that Trendland was a party to the first lawsuit.

Their position

is that as her attorneys they had no responsibility and,
consequently, no accountability for their actions.
lawsuit named Maxwell as a defendant.
by either side.

The first

Trendland was never joined

Even after the deposition testimony indicated

that Maxwell had conveyed her interest in the property to
Trendland, the plaintiff, Patricia Wade, did not join Trendland
as a necessary party.

Defendants assert that Maxwell, a non-

lawyer, should have requested that Trendland be joined.
hired defendants to represent her.

She

They had the responsibility

to determine who should be in or out of the lawsuit.
It is not consistent with principles of justice and fair
dealing to allow defendants to say that they had no
responsibility to adequately represent Maxwell in the first
lawsuit.

According to their position they could have committed

all sorts of blatant malpractice with complete impunity.

There

are two levels of malpractice present in this case: the instances
complained of by Maxwell are on one level; the second level is
comprised of the instances acknowledged by defendants which they
claim insulate them from any liability, namely, the failure to
involve Trendland in any way.

Defendants have taken the position
14

that because they did not properly interview their client or
properly review the case file, most notably Maxwell's deposition
transcript, they cannot be held liable for any resulting
malpractice.

CONCLUSION
Maxwell has suffered a loss due to the alleged malpractice
of defendants.

Because she is in breach of her agreement with

Trendland, she owes Trendland the equivalent of the monetary
value of the property.
Even if Maxwell's damages will not occur until Trendland
makes a formal demand, Maxwell may recover because the loss is
"reasonably certain" to occur and the value of the loss is simple
to calculate.

"If)
DATED this ^>~ day of October, 1995.
WHATCOTT, BARRETT & HAGEN

Jeffrey fE. flagen
Kevin D. Whatcott
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^

day of October, 1995, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
Carman E. Kipp
William W. Barrett
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, #300
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM

17

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4
5

SANDRA L. MAXWELL,
RICHARD C. BURKE,
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT

6
Plaintiffs,

Transcript of:

7
8

Motion for Summary
Judgment

vs.

9
10

JOHN T. CAINE, RANDALL W.
RICHARDS, RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Defendants.

11

* * # * *

12
13

Case No. 920901881

The

above-entitled

cause

of

action

came

on

14

regularly for hearing before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley,

15

a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State

16

of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Monday, March 25,

17

1995, at 9:00 a.m.

18

APPEARANCES

19
20

For the Plaintiffs:

JEFFREY H. HAGEN, ESQ.
KEVIN WHATC0TT, ESQ.
WHATCOTT, BARRETT & HAGEN
10 West Broadway #450
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendants:

CARMAN KIPP
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 400 South #300
Salt Lake City, Utah

21
22
23
24
25

1

MONDAY, MARCH 27, J995

2

9:00 A.M.

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

4

calendar, case No. 920901881.

5

identify yourselves for the record, please.

6

VOICE:

Let's go to the No. 1 case on the
Counsel, would you

I am Carman Kipp, Your Honor. I

7

represent the Adams and the law firm in connection with

8

that portion of the claim in the suit that is made by

9

Sandra Maxwell.

10
11
12
13

VOICE:

Kevin Whatcott and Jeff Hagen

representing Sandra Maxwell.
THE COURT:

Thank you, counsel.

Mr. Kipp, are

you prepared to go forward, sir?

14

MR. KIPP:

15

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
You may do so. Mr. Kipp, before

16

you begin let me say to you and Mr. Whatcott and Mr.

17

Hagen that in preparation or in preparing for this matter

18

over the weekend. I was about halfway through my

19

preparation in reading the memoranda that is on file in

20

this matter and then I looked at the last order signed by

21

the Court, which was an Order of Dismissal and I did not

22

look at that order close enough because when I saw that

23

order. I assumed that all of the issues in this case had

24

been resolved.

25

So I did not —

MR. KIPP:

Your Honor. I can similarly report

1

that I went skiing at Park City In the spring sunshine,

2

a n d It w a s w o n d e r f u l , a n d I didn't e v e n h a v e a eecond

3

t h o u g h t aboul

4

remembered I was supposed to be here at 9.

5

are very similar.

6

t'.iie mil 11 n h o u \

THE COURT:
T

H .'< t h i s m o r n i n g w h e n I

'\JUI until is what I was going to

7

say,

8

through the materials to discover that

9

The issues

did want you to know that I did get far enough

I lotion for Summary Judgment is whether or not I

10

believe Ms. Maxwell actually owns the property that is

11

t h e a l l e g e d s u b j e c t , I believe,, "I tk r damhge

12

MR

K1PP

I t h i n k I c a n v o c a l i z e . Y o u r Honor,

13

and counsel can and the briefs are not long.

14

Court wants to take a minute i

15

very simple.

16
17
in

claim.

If the
- 1B

Having completed some discovery, including the
d e p o s i t i o n s of t h e on hei' p I M n l I 1" i

hi c h a r d B u r k e , w h o is

"other of S a n d r a M a x w e l l , and h a v i n g completed

19

Sandra Maxwell's deposition, it became evident that Ms.

20

M a x w e l l d i d n o t o-

i
221
23

rl t o + > H «

operty
awsuit.

In q u e s t i o n at a n y t^™**

And, in fact, t r a n s f e r r e d

"«ah c o r p o r a t i o n in September o f 1 9 8 7 .
Very briefly, 7 our Honorr Mie c l a i m s originally

\\\

asserted w e r e p r i n c i p a l l y related t o a h i s t o r y o f about

2fi

oi-x y e a r s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b y A l l e n . C a i n e & Rich •••

f

1

Ogden for Mr. Burke for having to do with his company,

2

Advance Business Equipment, and Sandra Maxwell.

3

represent those folks.

4

the lawsuit.

5

They settled.

I do not

They are out of

The only single claim remaining is a claim by

6

Ms. Maxwell that Mr. Adams didn't do a good job in

7

looking out for her.

8

where a Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in favor

9

of a divorce plaintiff, now the ex-wife of Mr. Burke,

10

with respect to a specific piece of property known as

11

Pepperwood.

12

was distributed out of that court proceeding to the ex-

13

wife.

14

Honor, because at that point in time the property was on

15

the records by a Utah corporation known as Trenlin and

16

had been for some time.

I had one hearing in this court

As a result, half of the Pepperwood property

Exactly how that was achieved is beyond me, Your

17

But in either-or any case. Your Honor, the

18

claim before the Court here is a claim by Ms. Maxwell

19

that we were professionally negligent and loss resulted

20

to her.

21

Interestingly enough, the case which I was

22

involved is the latest leading authority on the elements

23

of a lawyer malpractice claim is cited and I am sure you

24

are aware of those elements.

25

them before this Court.

In fact, we have argued

This case is one of no harm-no
3

If aht didn't own the property, she can't claim

1

foul

°

the loss,

I T I S clear she did not own 'the property

having transferred iu m
4

September "•*" ,CJU*'

stock I i'i Mi In company and sh. -

*

Counsel asserts

-

- lelvuni lor
..- stock.

«

response that "oh

o

well, the company h a s some

7

some claim because she warranted the title of the

8

property when she passed to the company."

9

interesting but

i

10

This is now 1995

:he Statute of Limitations h a s long

11

since

12

effect that

13

claim for some property she didn't own.

14

may have

Well

that Is

opened in \M\\\

on these such claim and the record is to the
---

And
Buik'- hi"

She just made a

chain of events, Your Honor,

15

Mr

16

dispute about

17

any meaning to the Issues w e are addressing today; b it

18

ajiii'iirifj' ot iii'i' i •• open (::;,:! es,

19

company:

20

that are

21

d

22

subsequently as I have said in 1987, she transferred 1t

23

"to a new corporation that was formed and she go t :;. sto< \k

24
25

financial problems and there is some
exact details that really doesn't have

Advance Business Equipment.

Then for reasons

dispute and for consideration
ransferred it to hi s sister

:. we d
Maxwell

I: le acquired this property and h i s

And

't represent anybody except Sandra
represent the corporation. The
4

1

corporation had no claim against us. We had no

2

professional obligation to the corporation.

3

the case of Norman against Murray First Thrift and in our

4

reply brief when you get a chance to look at that, Your

5

Honor, that case says, and I quote, "Even though a

6

shareholder owns all or practically all of the stock in

7

the corporation, such a fact does not authorize him to

8

sue as an individual for a wrong done by a third party to

9

a corporation."

They cited

They would like to say, "Well, she owned

10

most of the stock, therefore she gets a loss." That may

11

be true, but that doesn't give her a right to sue in

12

place of the corporation.

13

They suggest a corporation can be substituted.

14

They can't do that.

15

barred by the statute and, three, the corporation has no

16

claim against us anyway.

17

corporation.

18

Your Honor.

19

One, it is not timely.

Two, it is

We didn't represent the

That is the simple nuts and bolts of it,

She didn't own the property.

The claim is she

20

lost half of the property and as a result suffered

21

damages.

22

ownership.

She couldn't have suffered damages.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. WHATCOTT:

25

She had no

Mr. Whatcott.
For the Court's benefit, I want

to go through a brief chronology because I think counsel
5

1

h H •' 1 H • nn I i' r J t t en 1 ia< • 1.8, or it. 11' n I elements that make

2

this a viable claim still•

3

It was back in February of 1978 that Advance

4
5

nt

w

company owned by Dick

Burke, assigned a land sale contract to Sandra Maxwell.
In May of 1983, Maxwell received a warranty deed

7

con trac 1:,:! i ig i e r t;j w hi ::il::i was a party by the name of

Q

Fisher.
property

'83 Maxwell is now

record owner of the

October -^j. 1985 Wade, who is Pick Burke's

formei wile, she brought an action seeking a claim on the
Pepperwood property.

This property that Advance Business

Equipment had sold or assigned to Maxwe] J

^

that action was filed, Sandra Maxwell was still the
record owner.

August

x^

deeded the propert;

16

inter, was when Ad*

17

: 1987 Sandra Maxwell warranty
988, •:
represented Maxwell.

Now, keep in mind that at this point Adams is

xo

a h v 1 K »M

'Hr v

11" i 11 'i i iii i""i* i "1 o \i 1 , i \In- " 111 iiV I u\M n t h e

19

property BH Hhe- duesn t have a claim,"

20

she transferred that property to Trenlin that Adams

21

represent e 1 \v\ t , r

22

tiled prior1 10 her transferring the property to Trenlin.

23

It was in September of

24

representation c • •

25

order granting Wade essentially Maxwel

But it was after

.*• month after Adams began his
I Ui<J

-

Lered an
interest in the
6

1

property.

2

There are really two arguments that arise out

3

of this. The first one I think is very simple.

It is

4

the warranty deed argument.

5

may have a claim against Maxwell under the warranty deed,

6

Utah Code Annotated 57-1-12 is very clear.

7

grantor, heirs, personal representatives, will forever

8

warrant and defend title thereof, the grantees, his

9

heir8, and assigns against all unlawful claims

To the extent that Trenlin

Says, "The

10

whatsoever."

11

to Trenlin has an obligation to defend Trenlin's interest

12

in the property.

13

So Maxwell in warranty deeding the property

Now, any claim that Trenlin may have on the

14

property necessarily falls on the shoulders of Maxwell.

15

She is required to warrant and defend the title.

16

be that when all is said and done, if Maxwell recovers

17

that that recovery belongs, because of the warranty deed,

18

to Trenlin, but that is not the point here.

19

simply that she warranty deeded it to Trenlin.

20

is out because of her actions.

21

that claim, the claim that Trenlin may have, but really

22

what we are talking about here is not title to the

23

property.

24

are talking about is the damage suffered by Maxwell

25

because of Adams.

It may

The point is
Trenlin

She is required to secure

This isn't an action to quiet title. What we

7

1
°

This is a legal malpractice claim.

Maxwell, in

establishing her claim, has to establish the elements
that Mr. Kipp has thoughtfully put, i rth hi the

4

memorandum and he is correct.

5

about today Is damage:

6

measure of the damage

7

"Yes," but the measure of

8

Pepperwood proper t;

9

Pepperwood

The element we are talking

has she suffered damage?

The

*w* r In UIH question is
• damage Is the value of the
is not the ownership of the
\ t reason that we

10

continually talk about the Pepperwood property and who

11

should have owned the Pepperwood

12

p r 0 perty.

Again, Junk back at the chronology.
87,

Maxwell

13

transferred to Trenlin in

Adams representing

14

Maxwell in *88, and then a month I ater Wade tfouJd give

15

h

property.

16

Two significant points arise out of this
jUifi HI1 t Ion in

17

chronology.

First.

18

awarding the property

19

transactions from 197f

20

basis of our malpract

21

legitimate Statute ol limitations defense that was not

22

set forth.

23

Maxwell "" H c.ouhfiel ciiJ d 1 10 t assert, thuM-p o'l&l.uifa, I he L'uurt

24

went back a period of eight years and undid nil

25

transactions in-between.

.*.,>- undid all of the
*••• 1987.

This was the underlying

In I in "1*1 II in I imp ?f WMM «

That is the basis of the claim,

Because

of the

Therefore, 1£ we are able to
8

1

try to set things straight, set things the way they

2

should be, title to the property still has to pass

3

through Maxwell before it gets to Trenlin.

4

interest because the transfer — we are not just talking

5

about the transfer from her, but the transfer to her has

6

been undone.

7

Maxwell after her transfer and I can't emphasize this

8

point enough•

9

this point to come in and claim that Maxwell has no

She has an

But more importantly, Adams represented

I keep going back to it.

But for Adams at

10

interest in the property, would be essentially to have

11

allowed Adams to do whatever he wanted.

12

given Adams no responsibility to act with proper regard

13

to his client's interest because he can sit back and say,

14

"Well, I may be representing Maxwell in this action that

15

deal solely with the Pepperwood property, but you know

16

what, if I mess up it doesn't matter because really,

17

wink-wink, Maxwell doesn't own that property.

18

does."

19

represented Maxwell with respect to this very property

20

that we are talking about today.

It would have

Trenlin

And yet Adams represented to the Court that he

21

In essence, Maxwell would then be without any

22

recourse, without any cause of action against Adams for

23

his misdeeds, and this is something that the Court

24

shouldn't allow.

25

negligently in all other respects toward his client,

The Court shouldn't allow Adams to act

9

1

Sandra Maxwell, and then in the end come back and say,

2

"Well, I am sorry, she can't sue me because I really

3

nitfcirepreaentedto the Court her ownershIp 1 ntereat, or

4

she really had no claim in the underlying matter."

5

reality, she had a claim

6

on the pi

7

were undone.

8

recover the actual property but just

9

damages, how was she damaged?

She had a claim

3cause all o:l: the PI lor transactions
We are looking here, Your Honor, not t o
ut of a measure of

And i'". 1 n fact, that

10

damage relates to this claim by Trenlin against her,

11

which could come In the future, thenraofoelfc.But that

12

not an issue for this Court to worry about

13

issue for these parties to worry about.

14

somethl iig: tha t ma $ come J ;E „ ter

15

percent of whatever recovery Maxwell gets here against

16

her, but that is not the issue.

18

this Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, everybody

19

agreed way back to 1 ho time that Adams was representing

20

her, everybody agreed Uie! ulir lii'ni an Inter* :

21

property arid because of that action by Wade sht

22

required to defend.

23

It is not

That is

Tr

The issue is simply was

it

For that ro&son, Youi Honor „ wo <* mid eek I he

24

Court to deny tl le Motion for Summary Judgment.

25

case go forward.

Let this

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. KIPP:

Thank you, Mr. Whatcott.

Mr. Kipp.

I can be brief, Your Honor.

This, I

3

guess, really doesn't matter to the lawsuit but there

4

isn't any record before you, nor is it a fact that we

5

made any representations about title to the property or

6

agreed to her having an interest.

7

she had no interest.

8

transcript of the proceedings said that Adams, who is now

9

deceased and not available, Adams said, "Well, Judge, I

The record is clear

As far as representing her, the

10

don't really represent her but thinking about

11

representing her."

12

That doesn't really matter to this.

She sold the property to a corporation and got

13

corporate stock for the property.

And she did that

14

before any of the events that relate to any clients

15

occurred, including the order by the Court in 1988 with

16

respect to the property.

17

property then.

She sold it of record and she has been

18

paid in stock.

She still owns the stock.

19

in this lawsuit.

20

should have put them in, but they are not in.

21

barred by the statute to make a claim against her since

22

their damage occurred as a result of the order of 1988.

23

They can't make that claim now.

24

should be out of this lawsuit.

25

THE COURT:

She had no interest in the

Trenlin is not

Maybe somebody screwed up and they
They are

She has no damage and we

Thank you, Mr. Kipp.

Counsel, what
11

1

1

.

i >« *hi e to get this

2

done by the end * T I t *••

3

Whatcott's motion and Memorandum in Opposition, ao well

4

-e

need to read Mr,

o.

5

MR, KIPP:

6

THE COURT:

What was that, Your Honor?
I am just tell ing

7

\\< Menu/ in Opposition, ae wel 1 as the Reply Memo

Q

and I would expect to have a ruling on this matter for
y O U by the end of the week.

11
I I

MR. WHATCOTT:

Your Honor, in the Reply

Memorandum, we did not include the argument which we

12

believe ax, x,i

II

further, *«

.14

argument that Adams represented Maxwell after the

15

transfer occurred; an-l w- are Jutst looking at the undoing

16

of a] 1 of the prior transfers.

17

4

' luuklu^ Iniu I he matter
strongest argument and that being this

If the Court would allow or would deem

18

appro pi Ifilr

19

memorandum tu that effect if the Court would find that

20

helpful.

21

t

22

believe at this point

23

w* wnvilil .like to submit a supplemental

* Memorandum in Oppositic

I don't think

\o

adgment adequately covers what we

THE COURT:

24

i

25

expressed that point.

*

strongest argument.

Let m^ o<^y, Mr. Whatcott

;

However, your oral argument has clearly

12

1

MR. WHATCOTT:

2

MR. KIPP:

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Thank you, Your Honor.

3

(Hearing adjourned.)

4

* * * **
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7
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9
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13
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1
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

I, DOROTHY L. TRIPP, C.S.R., do hereby
o
7

certify:
That I am one of the Official Court Reporters
of the Third District Court of the State of Utah,

y
•«rt

The

995, I reported

the testimony and proceedings, to the best of my
ability on said date

:: the above-entitled matter,

presided over by

i

uley, a

Judge in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah; and that the foregoing pages, numbered
from 1 to 1.3,

, true MIK!

correct account of hearing to the best of my
17

understanding, skill and ability on said date.

18
ig

20

Dated at Salt Lake City. Utah, this J'

day

of August, 1995.
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"Dorothy L. T#ipp, C. S. R.///
O f f i e i a l Court R e p o r t e r 7 '
License No. 00074-1801-8

A I I ACHMENT 1

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
S t e v e n W. Dougherty ( # 0 9 0 6 )
S c o t t A. C a l l ( # 0 5 4 4 )

700 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
SANDRA L. MAXWELL;
RICHARD C. BURKE; and
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT,
a Utah corporation,

AMENDED COMPLAINT
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN T. CAINE,
RANDALL W. RICHARDS,
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS, a
Utah professional partnership;
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, a Utah
professional partnership; the
ESTATE OP JOHN S. ADAMS, by and
through KENT M. KASTING, Personal
Representative; and
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS 6 LOWE,
a Utah professional corporation,

Civil No. 920901881 CN
Judge

Defendants.
Plaintiffs complain of defendants, and, demanding trial by
jury, seek relief as follows:

114. On November 28, 1990 the Court conducted a hearing on
Burke's Motion for Relief. Neither Caine nor RC&A appeared at that
hearing to rebut Burke's Affidavit.
115. On December 4, 1990 the Court entered its Minute Entry
vacating and setting aside the June 23, 1989 Order because it Nwas
entered without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff [Burke] and
contrary to plaintiff's instructions to his attorney [Caine and
RC&A].M
116. That Minute Entry was reduced to an Order entered on
December 27, 1990.
THE PEPPERWOOD ACTION INVOLVING CAINE. RICHARDS AND RC&A
117. On October

8#

1985, Wade

filed an action in Third

Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, designated as Civil No.
C85-6773, against Burke, ABE, Maxwell and others, claiming that
Burke and Maxwell committed fraud by obtaining declarations in the
Decree that (1) the Pepperwood Property was not part of the marital
estate; and (2) ABE was not Burke's alter ego.
118. In her Complaint Wade sought to set aside a transfer of
the Pepperwood

Property

from ABE

to Maxwell as a fraudulent

conveyance, and to obtain an order declaring that Maxwell held
one-half of the Pepperwood Property in constructive trust for the
benefit of Wade.

21

1988)

conclusively

established

that

motions

for

reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e)

Entered into a Stipulation agreeing to prejudicially
shorten the time for the August 15# 1988 hearing on
Wade'8 Motion for Entry of Judgment; and

(f)

Failed to ensure that Maxwell's new counsel timely filed
a Notice of Appeal of the Court's September 7, 1988 Order
and Judgment.

259. As a direct and proximate result of Richards' and RC&A's
negligence, Maxwell incurred substantial damage, including, but not
limited to, her loss of one-half of the Pepperwood Property, having
a value of approximately $600,000.
260. Maxwell is entitled to recover from Richards and RC&A all
damages sustained by Maxwell as a direct and proximate result of
Richards' and RC&A's negligence, including, but not limited to, the
damages set forth in paragraph 259 above.
XIV
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(AGAINST ADAMS AND TEA&L)
(Breach of Contract/Pepperwood Action)
For the Eleventh Claim for Relief, Maxwell complains against
defendants Adams' Estate and TEA&L, and alleges as follows:

55

261. Maxwell realleges and incorporates herein by reference
paragraphs 1 through 260 set forth hereinabove.
262. Maxwell entered into a valid contract whereby Adams and
TEA&L agreed to provide legal services to Maxwell in exchange for
a fee.
263. Maxwell's contract with Adams and TEA&L, which included
an implied covenant of competence, diligence and due care, required
Adams and TEA&L:
(a)

To be adequately prepared, upon accepting representation
of Maxwell, to defend Maxwell against all motions brought
against her;

(b) To zealously defend Maxwell's interests in all hearings
where relief was sought against Maxwell;
(c)

To timely file notices of appeal of all final orders
adversely affecting Maxwell's interests;

(d)

To request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 1988
Order on the grounds that the previously decided opinion
oS the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors,

761

P.2d

42, 44-45

(Utah App.

1988)

conclusively established that motions for reconsideration
were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e)

To file reply memoranda supporting motions brought by
Adams and TEA&L on Maxwell's behalf; and
56

(f)

To give Maxwell proper legal advise regarding her failure
to appeal final orders.

264. In breach of their contract with Maxwell in the implied
covenant of competence, diligence and due care, Adams and TEA&L
inexcusably:
(a)

Failed to request a continuance of the August 15, 1988
hearing on Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment;

(b)

Failed

to make

any

argument

whatsoever on Maxwell's

behalf at the August 15, 1988 hearing on Wade's Motion
for Entry of Judgment;
(c)

Failed

to

file

timely

notices

of

appeal of

(1) the

Court's September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; (2) the
Court's

October

21, 1988 Order; and

(3) the Court's

February 17, 1989 Order;
(d)

Failed to request the Court to reconsider its October 21,
1988 Order on the grounds that the previously decided
opinion of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp.
v.* James Constructors, 761 P.2d
1988)

conclusively

established

42, 44-45 (Utah App.
that

motions

for

reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e)

Failed

to

file any reply memorandum with respect to

Maxwell's December 28, 1988 Motion for Relief from the
September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; and

57

(f)

Incorrectly advised Maxwell through Burke that Burke's
appeal of the Court's December 2, 1988 Order would
adequately protect Maxwell

from the effects of the

Court's September 7, 1988 and October 21, 1988 Orders.
265. As a direct consequence of Adams' and TEA&L's breaches of
contract, Maxwell lost one-half of the Pepperwood Property.
266. By reason of Adams' and TEA&L's breaches of contract,
Maxwell has suffered damages resulting from those defendants'
breach

in an amount

in excess of $600,000, plus prejudgment

interest as provided by law, the precise amount of which will be
established by proof at trial.
XV
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(AGAINST ADAMS AND TEA&L)
(Negligence/Pepperwood Action)
For the Twelfth Claim for Relief, Maxwell complains against
defendants Adams' Estate and TEA&L, and alleges as follows:
267. Maxwell realleges and incorporates herein by reference
paragraphs 1 through 266 set forth hereinabove.
268. As Maxwell'8 attorneys, Adams and TEA&L owed Maxwell a
duty to represent Maxwell's interest with competence, diligence and
due care and to possess the legal skills and knowledge common to

58

members of their profession, which included among other things, the
duties
(a)

To be adequately prepared, upon accepting representation
of Maxwell, to defend Maxwell against all motions brought
against her;

(b)

To zealously defend Maxwell's interests in all hearings
where relief was sought against Maxwell;

(c)

To timely file notices of appeal of all final orders
adversely affecting Maxwell's interests;

(d)

To request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 1988
Order on the grounds that the previously decided opinion
of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake Citv Corp, v. James
Constructors,

761

P.2d

42,

44-45

(Utah

App.

1988)

conclusively established that motions for reconsideration
were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e)

To file reply memoranda supporting motions brought by
Adams and TEA&L on Maxwell's behalf; and

(f)

T Q give Maxwell proper legal advise regarding her failure
to appeal final orders.

269. In breach of the duties set forth above, Adams and TEA&L,
among other things, negligently
(a)

Failed to request a continuance of the August 15, 1988
hearing on Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment;

59

(b)

Failed to make any argument whatsoever on Maxwell's
behalf at the August 15, 1988 hearing on Wade's Motion
for Entry of Judgment;

(c)

Failed to file timely notices of appeal of

(1) the

Court's September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; (2) the
Court's October 21, 1988 Order; and (3) the Court's
February 17, 1989 Order;
(d)

Failed to request the Court to reconsider its October 21,
1988 Order on the grounds that the previously decided
opinion of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp.
v, James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App.
1988)

conclusively

established

that

motions

for

reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e)

Failed to file any reply memorandum with respect to
Maxwell's December 28, 1988 Motion for Relief from the
September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; and

(f)

Incorrectly advised Maxwell through Burke that Burke's
appeal of the Court's December 2, 1988 Order would
adequately protect

Maxwell

from the effects of the

Court'8 September 7, 1988 and October 21, 1988 Orders.
270. As a direct and proximate result of Adams' and TEA&L's
negligence, Maxwell incurred substantial damage, including, but not

60

limited to, her loss of one-half of the Pepperwood Property, having
a value of approximately $600,000.
271. Maxwell is entitled to recover from Adams and TEA&L all
damages sustained by Maxwell as a direct and proximate result of
Adams' and TEA&L's negligence, including, but not limited to, the
damages set forth in paragraph 270 above.
XVI
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(AGAINST CAINE, RC&R AND RC&A)
(Breach of Contract/Child Support Judgments)
For the Thirteenth Claim for Relief Burke complains against
defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A, and alleges as follows:
272. Burke realleges and incorporates herein by reference
paragraphs 1 through 271 as set forth hereinabove.
273. Burke entered into a valid contract whereby Caine, RC&R
and RC&A agreed to provide legal services to Burke in exchange for
a fee.
274. Burke'8

contract

with

Caine, RC&R

and

RC&A, which

included an implied covenant of competence, diligence and due care,
required Caine, RC&R and RC&A, among other things,:
(a)

To prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law
supporting the Decree in accordance with the court's
January 5, 1984 Order in the Divorce Action, stating that
61

3.

That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of

4.

That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the

suit*

Court deems appropriate.
WHEREFORE, under the Eleventh Claim for Relief, Maxwell prays
for judgment against Defendants Adams and TEA&L as follows:
1.

That those defendants be adjudicated as having breached

their contract with Maxwell and are, therefore, liable to Maxwell.
2.

That Maxwell have and recover from those defendants

judgment for all damages sustained by Maxwell at least in the
amount of $600,000, plus prejudgment interest.
3.

For an award of incidental and consequential damages

suffered by Maxwell, including an award of Maxwell's reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred in this matter.
4.

That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of

5.

That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the

suit.

Court deems-appropriate.
WHEREFORE, under the Twelfth Claim for Relief, Maxwell prays
for judgment against Defendants Adams and TEA&L as follows:
1.

That defendants Adams and TEA&L be adjudicated as having

negligently represented Maxwell.
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2.

That Maxwell have and recover from those defendants

judgment for all damages sustained by Maxwell at least in the
amount of $600,000, plus prejudgment interest.
3.

That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of

suit.
4.

That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the

Court deems appropriate.
WHEREFORE, under the Thirteenth Claim for Relief, Burke prays
for judgment against Defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A as follows:
1.

That those defendants be adjudicated as having breached

their contract with Burke and are, therefore, liable to Burke.
2.

That

Burke

have

and

recover

from

those defendants

judgment for all damages sustained by Burke at least in the amount
of $48/000, plus prejudgment interest.
3.
suffered

For an award of incidental and consequential damages
by Burke, including

an award of

Burke's reasonable

attorneys' fees incurred in this matter*
4.

That Burke recover from those defendants his costs of

suit.
5.

That Burke have such other and further relief as the

Court deems appropriate.
WHEREFORE, under the Fourteenth Claim for Relief, Burke prays
for judgment against Defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A as follows:
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ATTACHMENT 2

29
Q

What was the next piece of property --

okay# we've now talked about your home that you
still live in.

What was the next piece of real

property that you've either purchased or received?
A

That would be the large piece,

Pepperwood property.
MR. KAY:

Would you mark that.

(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit
No. 1 was marked for
identification.)
Q

(BY MR. KAY)

I'm going to hand you,

Mrs. Maxwell, Defendant's Exhibit 1 which is
entitled an Assignment of Contract that was given
to me by your attorney this morning.

Is that your

understanding, an Assignment of Contract relating
to what you've described as the Pepperwood
property?
A

Yes.

Q

What was the date that you received an

interest in the Pepperwood property?
MR. HAGEN:

You can look at what it

says on there if you want.

24
25

Q

THE WITNESS:

1970.

(BY MR. KAY)

Well, I believe does it

say that you received it February --

Transcribe America
(800) 8330288 / (202) 842-4602
1111 14th Street. NW. Fourth Floor /Washington. DC 20005-5650

3

A

I'm sorry.

Q

I think that's the original Uniform

Real Estate Contract.
^

I'm looking down here.

Is it your understanding it

was approximately February 27th, 1976?

%

A

i

Yeah.
MR. KIPP:
MR. KAY:

What are we looking at now?
We're looking at the

pepperwood Assignment of Contract that's been

V

marked as Exhibit 1 in the documents they gave us
today.

It's that document that you have in your

hand.
•2
IS

MR. KIPP:
Q

Thank you.

JJ
11
££

(BY MR. KAY)

How was it that you

received this Pepperwood property that's been

j5

described in Exhibit 1 in February of 1976?

X<T

A

I'm sorry, what do you mean?

17

Q

Well, prior to February 27th, 1976, I

It

understand that you didn't have the Pepperwood

19

property; is that

correct?

20

A

Yes, uh-huh.

21

Q

Who owned the Pepperwood property

22

before February 27, 1976?

23

A

Advance Business Equipment.

24

Q

And Advance Business Equipment is a

25

company that your brother, Richard Burke owns; is
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the '70's, or not?
*

£l

4

f
§

A

I believe it was in the '80's.

Q

So you bought the Pepperwood property

from the Fishers and paid payments for a few years;
is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

And then in 1976, February 27, 1976,

i

y° u assigned the contract with the Fishers to

%

Sandra Maxwell; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

Now, why did you assign the contract

2

between Advance Business Equipment and the Fishers

j

to Sandra Maxwell?

4

A

Well, for two reasons, basically.

The

5

company was in a little bit of a financial problem

6

at that period of time and I didn't feel that the

7

company would have the money to make the next

i

I

payment to the Fishers, and we didn't want to lose

e

I
0

the property entirely, so -Q

Did you have a concern that if the

1

company still had the property, that creditors

2

could reach it?

J

A

Well, it wouldn't be creditors.

It

4

would just be that if we couldn't make the

5

payments, that Bud Fisher would probably take the

Transcribe America

ATTACHMENT 3
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A

To Mrs. Fisher?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes.

Q

How many years did you make payments?

A

0h# what, 10 years possibly.

I can't

remember exactly.
Q

After you made payments and paid off

the contract, did you receive a Warranty Deed from
the Fishers?
A

Yes,

Q

And you didn't produce any Warranty

Deed today; is that correct?
A

Apparently not.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit
No. 2 was marked for
identification.)

Q

(BY MR. KAY)

I'm going to hand you

what's been marked as Exhibit 2 to your deposition,
Mrs. Maxwell, and this is entitled Warranty Deed
from Frances Fisher to Sandra Maxwell dated May 20,
1983.

Is Exhibit 2 the Warranty Deed that you

received from Frances Fisher after you had paid the
contract on Pepperwood?
A

It looks to be that.

Q

Does this refresh your memory that you

TrnnScrihe America

•Ma 14 i * a nvuvt \w

i 4404466
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WARRANTY DEED

^s

Frances
s heerr,, Wife
(deceased)
r ranees F
r iim
«uc o
atf H.
«• R.
iv. Fisher
(imcr vocccaiea/
lake
City
of
Salt Lake City
County of Salt Lake
CONVEY and WARRANT to

srinfOf
$tM

Sandra I . Maxwell, a woman
of Ogden,, County o f Weber, S t a t e ot Utah
Ten dollars and other good and v a l u a b l e consideration

grantee
for &
(
_ c SVLtn 0_
DOLLARS

the foHowing described tract of land in
State of Utahs

u

flcrcbv

o f Utahf

County,

The South 396 feet o f the Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter o f the
Northeast quarter o f S e c t i o n 22; the South 396 feet of the Cast o n e - h a l f o f
the Northwest quarter o f the Northwest quarter ot the Northeast quarter o f
Section 22; the North 264 feec o f the Southeast quarter o f the Norchwese .
q*iarctr of the Northeast quarter o f S e c t i o n 22; and the .North 264 f e e t o f
th* Cast on«-half o f the Southv*»e quarter of th« Northveit quarter o f the
Northeast quarter o f S e c t i o n 2 2 , Township 3 South, Range 1 Z*9t9 SLB6M
SUBJECT to easements, r e s t r i c t i o n s and rights of way appearing o f r e c o r d , o r
«ntorceaole i n law o r e q u i t y .

WITNESS, the hand of said grantor, this
MJV

20 th
A.D. 1 9 8 3 ^
-^^si /* •• <** s * ^"r^t/^cAy^
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DEFENDANTS

ATTACHMENT 4

114. On November 28, 1990 the Court conducted a hearing on
Burke's Motion for Relief. Neither Caine nor RC&A appeared at that
hearing to rebut Burke's Affidavit.
115. On December 4, 1990 the Court entered its Minute Entry
vacating and setting aside the June 23, 1989 Order because it Hwas
entered without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff [Burke] and
contrary to plaintiff's instructions to his attorney [Caine and
RC&A]. H
116. That Minute Entry was reduced to an Order entered on
December 27, 1990.
THE PEPPERWOOD ACTION INVOLVING CAINE, RICHARDS AND RC&A
117. On October 8,

1985, Wade

filed an action in Third

Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, designated as Civil No.
C85-6773, against Burke, ABE, Maxwell and others, claiming that
Burke and Maxwell committed fraud by obtaining declarations in the
Decree that (1) the Pepperwood Property was not part of the marital
estate; and (2) ABE was not Burke's alter ego.
118. In her Complaint Wade sought to set aside a transfer of
the Pepperwood

Property

from ABE

to Maxwell as a fraudulent

conveyance, and to obtain an order declaring that Maxwell held
one-half of the Pepperwood Property in constructive trust for the
benefit of Wade.

21

Page 74

available right now, I don't honestly know,
Q

As you sit here today, can you give me

any estimate as to how much money you paid John
Caine or his firm during the time they represented
you or your company?
A

Oh, I have no idea as to the amount.

Q

I want to shift to what's going to be

called the Pepperwood case where you had your
deposition taken and that is the case of Wade
versus Burke C-87-2491.
talking about?
Mr, Burke.

Do you know which case I'm

Let me rephrase that last thing,

I believe that Sandra Maxwell had her

deposition taken in the case of C-85-6773 called
Patricia Wade versus Richard Burke, Sandra Maxwell,
the Fishers and others.

Do you understand that to

be what has been entitled the Pepperwood
litigation?

That's different from where your

deposition was taken.

It's a different case than

what your deposition was taken.
A

Why would that be a different case?
MR. HAGEN:

know.

I don't know.

I don't

Just answer the questions as best you can.
MR. KAY:

I will just represent for the

record that your amended complaint on page 21,
paragraph 117 when it talks about the Pepperwood

1

action, talks about the case entitled C-85-6773.

2
3

MR, HAGEN:

Which paragraph again of

the complaint?

41

MR. KAY:

Paragraph 117 on page 21.

I

5

just want to make sure we're all talking about the

6

same thing.

7
81
9

MR. HAGEN:

6773.

That's this one.

Okay.
Q

(BY MR. KAY)

Do you recall that case,

10

the case regarding the Pepperwood property?

11

it's paragraph 117 of your amended complaint.

12
13

A

Yes, I do.

And

I'm kind of confused as to

why there's a different number --

14

Q

My understanding --

15

A

-- on this one.

16

Q

My understanding, and I'm not certain

17

about this, Mr. Burke, but I understand there were

18

two pieces of litigation going on and there may

19

have been some agreement that the depositions in

20

both cases could be used for each case because he

21

talked some of them about the same subject matter.

22

A

23

I ever made.

24
25

Q

Boy, that's certainly not an agreement

Well, I don't know if that's accurate

or not, Mr. Burke.

All I'm trying to do is we're

ATTACHMENT 5

46
No. 3 was marked for
identification.)
Q

(BY MR. KAY)

I'm going to hand you

what's been marked as Exhibit 3 to your
deposition.

Can you tell me what that is,

Mrs. Maxwell?

Do you know what Exhibit 3 is?

A

A Warranty Deed.

Q

At some point after May of 1983, did

you transfer your interest in the Pepperwood
property to a corporation called Trendland, Inc.?
A

Yes.

Q

And was that approximately September

23rd, 1987?
A

Yes, uh-huh.

Q

Did you sign this deed and have it

notarized on September 23rd, 1987?
A

Yes.

Q

That is your signature under the date?

A

Yes.

Q

Why did you transfer this property

through Exhibit 3, the Warranty Deed to Trendland,
Inc. in September of 1987?
A

Well, we had hopes of developing the

piece of property.
Q

Who is we?

Transcribe America

A

Myself and the -- myself principally.
MR. KIPP:

I'm not able to hear you.

THE WITNESS:
MR. HAGEN:
Q
again.

(BY MR. KAY)

I'm sorry.
Do you want to repeat.
Let me ask the question

Why did you transfer the Pepperwood

property to Trendland, Inc. in September of 1987?
A

We had hopes of developing the piece of

propertyQ

And when you say we, are you only

referring to yourself or someone else?
A

Well, primarily, at first myself.

Q

What was Trendland, Inc.?

A

It was a corporation.

Q

Is this a corporation that you were an

officer in?
A

No,

I had primarily most of the -- the

majority -- I shouldn't say most, I should say the
majority of the stock in Trendland.
Q

Were you an officer or director in

Trendland at the time that you conveyed the
Pepperwood property to Trendland in September of
1987?
A

I don't believe so, no.

Q

How much money were you paid by

Transcribe America

A

Yes, he did.

Q

Okay, when?

A

Well, I don't know the exact time that

he first started to represent me,

I don't know,

thought it was in 1978 sometime.
Q

Do you have any explanation why your

wife's attorney sent you a Motion for Sanctions on
December 14, 1978 instead of sending it to John
Caine?
A

I don't know the answer to that.

Q

We were talking about the Pepperwood

case before lunch, Mr. Burke, and I believe you
said that Trendland paid the property taxes on
Pepperwood; is that correct?
A

Trendland paid the rollback taxes on

the Pepperwood property.
Q

Of approximately $30,000?

A

Approximately.

I don't know the exact

amount.
Q
about?

How did the Trendland Corporation come
Whose idea was it?

A

Well, it was Sandra Maxwell's.

She

wanted the property into a corporation which would
take some of the pressure off her, and she also
wanted to have it in a vehicle for future

Transcribe America

development.

So it was because of that that I

initially started Trendland and we had the property
put into Trendland.
Q

Can you tell me how putting the

Pepperwood property in a corporation was going to
take pressure off of Sandra Maxwell?
A

Well # she wouldn't directly own the

property any more, not directly.

She would

indirectly because she was such a large
stockholder, she could receive stock from the
corporation from putting the property into it.
Q

What did Sandra Maxwell get for putting

vtj

the Pepperwood property into the Trendland

j4

Corporation?

:

jif

A

Shares of stock.

jjf

Q

And what were the shares of stock of

ff
|t

Trendland worth when she put the property into it?
A

Well, the shares of stock would have to

U

be set up as to the value or were set up as to the

20

value of the property at the time that she put the

9'

21

property in, and I don't recall what that value was

22

at that time at a l l .

23

Q

Okay, the incorporators of Trendland,

24

Inc. were Richard Burke, Maury Burke and Pamela

25

Reichert; is that correct?

TranScribe America
C800) 833-0288 / (202) 842-4602

a director?
MR. H A G E N :
foundation.
g

I'm going to object,

I d o n ' t think he can testify as to

what his s i s t e r k n o w s .
THE WITNESS:

g
I
*

I really can't.

I don't

know that.
Q

(BY M R . KAY) W a s your sister the only

shareholder of T r e n d l a n d ,
A

No.

Inc.?

T h e o t h e r people that came in as

j£

officers a n d d i r e c t o r s w e r e given shares of stock

il

in the c o r p o r a t i o n .

j2
13

Q

H o w m a n y shares of stock w a s your

sister g i v e n w h e n Trendland, Inc. was formed?

j4

A

I b e l i e v e it w a s 5 0 , 0 0 0 .

15

Q

H o w m a n y shares were you given?

\£

A

I w a s n ' t given any.

j7

Q

H o w m a n y shares were any of the other

Is
$9

officers o r d i r e c t o r s given?
A

At t h e time the corporation w a s formed,

there was n o n e g i v e n o u t .
Q

At a n y time after the corporation w a s

formed, w e r e a n y of the officers or d i r e c t o r s given
shares in T r e n d l a n d ,

Inc.?

A

Y e s , they w e r e .

Q

W e r e you given any?

Transcribe America
(800) 8330288 / (202) 842-4602
1111 14th Street, NW. Fourth Floor / Washington, DC 20005-5650
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WARRANTY DEED
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SANDRA L. HAXWELL, A WOMAN
County of

of Ogden, County of
CONVEY

Md WARRANT

Weber

Sate of Utah, hereby

to

TRENDLANO INC.
grantee
of

SALT LAKE CITY

for the turn of

County

SALT LAKE

, State of Utah

Ten d o l l a r s and other good and valuable consideration

DOLLARS

the following described tract of land in

County,

State of Utah, to-wit:
The South 396 feet of the Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 22; the South 396 feet of the East one-half of
the Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of
Section 22; the North 264 feet of the Southeast quarter of the Northwest
quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 22; and North 264 feet of the
East one-half of the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 22, Township 3 South, Range 1 East. SLB&M
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing of record, or
enforceable In law or equity.
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the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
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Notary Public
—Residing at
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ATTACHMENT 6

1
2

Q

to him about how he was going to get paid?

3
4

And wouldn't you expect that you'd talk

A

I probably did, but I don't remember

the conversation in regards to that,

5

Q

All right.

But it was clear that your

6

communications were on behalf of your sister to

7

establish a lawyer/client relationship between him

8

and his firm and your sister?

9

it?

That's true, isn't

10

A

That's correct,

11

Q

When you first talked to Mr. Ennenga, I

12

guess from what you said, it was briefly on the

13

telephone, do I have that right?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And then did you meet with him?

16

A

Yes, I believe I did.

17

Q

Where?

18

A

Up in his office.

19

Q

Who was present?

20

A

He and I were the only two people

21

there, and in briefly going over this, he says, I'd

22

like to introduce you to John Adams and he will be

23

representing your sister.

24

he took me in and introduced me to John Adams.

25

Q

And then as I remember,

John was a member of the firm at that

1

time, also, as far as you knew?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Was there anything written down about

41

what you were hiring him to do or what the

5

arrangements were between them as lawyers and their

61

client?

7

A

8

contract, no.

9

Q

10

MR. HAGEN:

THE WITNESS:

17

Yeah, I don't recall

that, if there was.

15
16

Objection, asked and

answered.

13
14

Was there a discussion of what their

rate would be or how they'd charge their fees?

11
12

I don't believe there was any written

MR. KIPP:

I think you're right.

I

was just following that along.
Q

(BY MR. KIPP)

Did you discuss with him

18

what specific tasks you had in mind the... dealing

19

with for her?

20

A

21
22

Well, nothing specific other than that

she needed representation on this case.
Q

She has told us she produced all the

23

documents she had.

24

information?

25

A

Do you have any contrary

No, to my knowledge, she had produced

1

all the documents.

2

Q

All right.

Did you review in any

3

detail with Mr. Ennenga or Mr. Adams the history of

41

this case or the problems and difficulties?

5

A

I must have done.

I mean gone into a

6

little bit of depth because they had to have an

7

understanding of the case.

8

know, specifically, you know, what was said by my

9

part or by their part, but I'm sure we had a

I don't recall, you

10

general conversation as to the nature of the case

11

and what was involved.

12

Q

How long did you talk with them?

13

A

I met with John on several different

14

occasions.

15

Q

Well, let's talk about before August

16

15th.

How many times did you meet with either or

17

both of them?

18

A

I believe I met with John just one

19

time.

20

him once or twice prior to August 15th, but I think

21

that I only met with him once but I'm not a hundred

22

percent certain that was.

23

I may have had a telephone conversation with

Q

The best memory is, though, you had one

24

meeting which we've been talking about, with

25

Ennenra and he introduced to you Adams before the

15th hearing; isn't that true?
A

That's correct.

Q

How long did that meeting last?

A

Oh, boy, I just don't have a rough idea

on time.
Q

Well, a minute, a day?

A

Probably more than an hour and maybe

less than two hours.
Q

All right.

Did you take any pleadings

with you?
A

I don't remember if I did or I didn't.

I figure I must have done, though.

He had to have

knowledge of the case.
Q

But you don't have any specific memory

of that?
A

I don't.

Q

Did you discuss the August 15th

hearing?
A
hearing.
Q

John called me up the same day of that
He called me up later that same morning.
I've asked that before.

talk about that.

I'm going to

I'd like to talk about the time

frame before they said, hear ye, hear ye, down at
the courthouse.

I intend to direct your attention

to that time frame.

Besides the meeting you've

1

told me about, did you talk to Adams or Ennenga

2

about the August 15th hearing before the hearing

3

commenced?

4

A

Yes, I talked to John about that and he

5

was aware of it because -- now, my best memory is

6

that Randy Richards or John Caine, one of the two

7

of them sent them down a notice of that hearing.

8
9
10

Q

Do you recall anything specifically

that was said in the conversation with him about
the hearing?

11

A

Not specifically, no.

12

Q

All right.

Now, I'd like to kind of

13

summarize, here you are, you've had this meeting,

14

you've talked to Ennenga, he's introduced you to

15

Adams, you talked to both of them for the period of

16

time you described.

17

reach about what they were going to do?

18
19

A

What understanding did you

That John Adams was going to represent

my sister in this case.

20

Q

There wasn't any question or any

21

conflict check involved or any investigation to be

22

done?

23

A

Not to my knowledge, there wasn't.

If

24

there was, it was done, you know, outside of what I

25

was

involved.

ATTACHMENT 7

u

A

Yes.

2

Q

My question, t h o u g h , before this w a s ,

3

did you ever tell him that you had deeded the

4

P e p p e r w o o d property to a c o r p o r a t i o n ?

5

A

No, I had not at that point in t i m e .

6

Q

Randy Richards appeared for you, made

7

an entry of appearance in the Pepperwood case on

8

D e c e m b e r 2nd, 1987.

And your d e p o s i t i o n was taken

9

on June 16th, 1988.

So I assume this first m e e t i n g

10

is sometime between December 2nd, 1987 and June of

11

'88.

12

three or four months b e f o r e the deposition; is that

13

correct?

And I think your best m e m o r y is it was maybe

14

A

As much as I can r e c a l l , yeah.

15

Q

Did you not convey the property in

16

S e p t e m b e r of 1987, the P e p p e r w o o d property

17

y o u r s e l f to Trendland,

from

Inc., in September of

1987?

18

A

I did.

19

Q

And so by the first time you ever met

20

Randy R i c h a r d s , you w e r e not the record owner of

21

the Pepperwood property;

22

A

correct?

I was under the impression as far as a

23

c h r o n o l o g i c a l date that I had met him

24

as far as I could

25

Q

beforehand,

remember.

W e l l , I want you to go by your m e m o r y ,
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but I also want you to know that up until October
30, 1987, you were represented from September 25th
1987 to October 30, 1987 by Kay Lewis and Bruce
Shapiro, and before that time, you were represented
by Roy Moore up until September 15th, 1987.
A

Uh-huh.

Q

So it just seems to me that September

23rd of '87 is before December.

I'm not going to

argue with you.
MR. KIPP:

You mean any more than

that?
MR. KAY:
MR. KIPP:

What?
Nothing.

THE WITNESS:

No, my memory is that

when I met Randy, that this had not happened yet.
Q

(BY MR. KAY)

Prior to the date of the

deposition on June 16th, 1988, had you ever told
Randy Richards that you had deeded the Pepperwood
property to Trendland, Inc.?
A

Right around that period of time was

when the corporation was being set up.

What had

happened in as far as the sequence of the
corporation being created, I'm not sure of what
time frame that was in when the deposition was
going on.

I knew it was in the process, but I

1

A

Yes, yes.

2

Q

And as you sat down to eat, was there a

3

bank of phones right near your table?

4

A

Not then.

The phone conversation or me

5

trying to reach my brother happened before we

61

walked across the street.

7
8

Q

And so was that in the building that

you had the deposition in?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And was there any discussion between

11

you and Randy before you called your brother?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And that was when you told -- is that

14

when you talked about the $30,000 problem?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Did you say anything to Randy before

17

you called your brother, regarding Trendland,

18

Inc.?

19

A

I believe that as far as Mr. Larsen

20

brought it up in the deposition something to the

21

effect of having the corporation being in

22

existence.

23

Q

you remember Mr. Larsen asking you

24

questions about whether there was a corporation

25

that you had deeded the property to?

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

My question is, did you ever have a

3

conversation with Randy before you called your

4

brother, where you told him that there was a

5

corporation called Trendland, Inc. that the

6

property was deeded to?

7

A

I believe Randy told me.

8

Q

It's your testimony that Randy told you

9
10

the name of the corporation you deeded the
corporation to?

11

A

That he was aware of the existence of

12

one, yes and I had told him the same thing that I

13

said during the deposition, I knew there was one in

14

the process of being formed, but I literally don't

15

know what steps it takes to form a corporation.

16

don't know how long a time frame you're speaking

17

of.

18

Q

I

Before the noon break, on the day of

19

your deposition, did you know the name of the

20

corporation that you understood was being formed?

21

A

I believe I did.

22

Q

Did y O U

*3|
24
25

have any discussion with Randy

about the name of the corporation during the lunch
hour?
A

I don't

know i f

I specifically

named

